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ABSTRACT 
 
The reporting of non-financial business information is highly regarded by valuation experts for 
better capital allocation decisions in the marketplace.  In January 2005, the AICPA created the 
Enhanced Business Reporting (EBR) Consortium and charged it with developing a framework that 
will improve the quality, integrity, and transparency of business information in a cost-effective and 
timely manner.  A draft of the EBR framework was completed in October 2005.  However, 
independent auditors may reject many provisions of the framework because auditing costs exceed 
informational benefits.  This study analyzes the current EBR framework from an independent 
auditor's perspective.  Qualitative analysis is used to evaluate the auditing implications of 
providing EBR disclosures to company stakeholders.  The findings indicate that the gains of 
providing better value oriented EBR information are offset by potential management 
misrepresentation through highly subjective EBR disclosures.  Moreover, many EBR elements are 
not subject to audit at reasonable cost.  The voluntary aspect of EBR makes intercompany and 
intracompany financial comparisons more difficult. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n December 2002, the AICPA created the Special Committee on Enhanced Business Reporting (EBR) to 
establish a consortium of investors, creditors, and other stakeholders to improve the quality and 
transparency of business reporting information.  In January 2005, the Special Committee completed its 
mission by creating the EBR Consortium which includes an independent, international consortium of financial 
reporting stakeholders.  During its tenure, the Special Committee created the Public Companies EBR Task Force and 
the Private Companies EBR Task Force to support the EBR Consortium.  The Public Companies Task Force focused 
on developing sample EBR reports for public companies; the Private Companies Task Force focused on ensuring the 
scalability of EBR for private companies. 
 
 The mission of the EBR Consortium recognizes the modern informational needs of business stakeholders.  
The reporting of non-financial business information is highly regarded by valuation experts for better capital 
allocation decisions in the marketplace (Bovee, et al., 2002).  The EBR Consortium is charged with developing a 
framework that will improve the quality, integrity, and transparency of business information in a cost-effective and 
timely manner.  However, there are many trade-offs in financial reporting, and independent auditors may reject 
provisions of the current EBR framework because auditing costs exceed informational benefits.  This study analyzes 
the current EBR framework from an independent auditor's perspective, and discusses implementation issues regarding 
the feasibility of applying EBR principles on a widespread basis. 
 
EBR PHILOSOPHY  
 
 The EBR philosophy argues that Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are increasingly 
irrelevant for modern business decisions because they were developed to describe a different economy (Wallison, 
2004).  In the early 20th century, GAAP accurately measured the performance of manufacturing enterprises such as 
those in the automobile and railroad industries.  The simple balance sheet valuations and corresponding matching of 
I 
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straightforward revenues and expenses provided ample financial information for investors.  However, our modern 
economy has moved to creating a significant portion of value through intellectual effort.  Accordingly, a modern 
financial reporting system should have a greater focus on the intangible assets associated with intellectual effort such 
as computer software, production methods, employee skills, etc.  While GAAP does recognize certain intangibles 
(e.g., patents, goodwill), it frequently fails to measure their value as a source of profitability.  GAAP requires the 
expensing of many intangibles, such as research and development, because their value is too speculative to be 
recorded as an asset.  However, expensing bona fide intangibles distorts the matching principle by showing reduced 
earnings in the current period and inflated earnings in future periods. 
 
 The EBR method involves supplementing traditional GAAP financial statements with leading performance 
indicators that capture the value of business intangibles by focusing on current and future performance rather than 
historical financial reporting.  Such an approach permits a long-term view of a company's prospects and alleviates the 
constant pressure to meet annual and quarterly earnings expectations.  The result is less market volatility, increased 
corporate efficiency, and more accurate security valuations.  The EBR framework develops a model for presenting 
these supplemental disclosures with the goal of improving the quality, integrity, and transparency of information for 
investors.  Transparency is the ability of stakeholders to understand the current and future prospects of a company 
(Hannon, 2003). 
 
THE EBR FRAMEWORK 
 
 In October 2005, the EBR Consortium published a draft of the EBR framework (EBR Consortium, 2005).  
This framework provides classifications for performance indicators and qualitative information that is associated with 
business valuation.  Special attention is given to utilizing Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) which is 
a language for electronic communication of business and financial data (Hoffman and Strand, 2001).  The Consortium 
distributed the framework draft as a starting point for discussion, and recognized that some of its provisions are 
debatable.  The EBR framework is divided along four categories of business reporting information.  These categories 
include the business landscape, strategy, competencies and resources, and performance. 
  
The business landscape dimension focuses on external forces that affect future prospects, and includes 
evaluating markets served; growth potential; capacity to withstand changes; competitive pressures; technological 
changes; capital availability; possible effects of litigation; etc.  The strategy dimension covers organizational 
structure; business model goals and timelines; the company's approach to risk management; environmental and social 
considerations; resource allocation; product lifecycle; etc.  The competencies and resources dimension addresses 
processes for continuous improvement; customer satisfaction; retaining and developing human capital; comparison of 
research and development expenditures to competitors; intellectual property and its role in company growth; 
information and technology developments; use of financial and physical assets; etc.  Finally, the performance 
dimension links the business landscape, strategy, and the competencies and resources dimensions to financial 
performance including profitability and liquidity. 
 
 Modern businesses frequently sacrifice long-term performance in order to achieve short-term earnings 
advances.  Treating the symptoms of performance difficulties yields faster results than addressing the underlying 
causes that create the difficulties.  Taking the “long view” of financial reporting is an admirable goal, and is clearly 
the central motivating factor behind the EBR movement.  The EBR framework provides a rich and interesting 
representation of the complex factors that affect future business performance.  Business valuation is predicated on the 
measurement of future earnings; the EBR framework accurately captures many qualitative and intangible business 
elements that affect a company's prospects.  However, in order to value the EBR framework beyond an academic 
exercise, one must consider the costs of implementation. 
 
CONSISTENCY AND COMPARABILITY 
 
 The voluntary aspect of EBR is troubling.  If companies can choose whether to provide EBR disclosures, 
consistency and comparability will suffer because only companies with favorable EBR profiles will choose to 
participate.  Business stakeholders will be required to compare the financial reporting disclosures of EBR companies 
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with those who only provide standard GAAP financial statements.  Accordingly, intercompany financial comparisons 
are more difficult.  Stakeholders will be measuring the inelastic GAAP performance measures against the elastic EBR 
performance measures.  Another troubling aspect of permitting voluntary EBR disclosures concerns the possibility 
that companies will provide EBR disclosures in one year and then delete them in the following year when previously 
touted intangible assets fail to materialize.  Thus, intracompany financial comparisons are more difficult. 
 
 If EBR is to be applied in practice, then participation should be mandatory by all affected companies.  The 
value of having intercompany and intracompany comparability in financial reporting is highly significant for fair 
valuations in the securities markets.  The voluntary aspect of EBR creates a serious conflict with the stated EBR goal 
of increasing transparency in financial reporting because stakeholders will lack reference points for comparing EBR 
and non-EBR companies. 
 
EBR FOR PRIVATE COMPANIES 
 
 The stated mission of the Private Companies EBR Task Force is to ensure the scalability of EBR for private 
companies.  However, the value of EBR disclosures for private companies is open to question (Tackett, et al., 2007).  
Stockholders are the primary stakeholder for publicly traded companies, but lenders/creditors are the primary 
stakeholder for private companies.  Short-term fluctuations in firm value are largely irrelevant for private companies.  
Accordingly, the external reporting needs of public company stockholders include financial information useful for 
determining firm value, but the external reporting needs of private companies include financial information useful in 
predicting the likelihood of loan repayment (i.e., cash flows over the life of the loan).  Valuation requires far greater 
precision in earnings measurement than loan repayment because firm valuation is a much more complicated issue.  
Therefore, public company EBR disclosures provide an added dimension in measuring long-term earnings 
performance, but these disclosures are generally irrelevant for private companies because they have little impact on 
lender/creditor decision-making.  Lenders/creditors are a good surrogate for other stakeholders such as employees, 
customers, vendors, local governments, etc. 
 
 A significant amount of EBR information is highly useful for private company internal reporting purposes.  
The Private Companies Task Force indicates that the scope of their research does not encompass private company 
financial reporting. However, they are developing their framework to accommodate the needs of creditors and other 
external stakeholders (Private Companies EBR Task Force, 2004).  This raises serious questions about mission 
validity for the Private Companies Task Force.  If the Private Companies Task Force utilizes the valuation oriented 
EBR framework as its underlying model, the resulting Private Company framework will focus on the information 
needs of the wrong stakeholder group.  The correct approach to implementing EBR for private company external 
stakeholders is to focus on the information needs of lenders/creditors.  For example, short-term lenders would find 
very little useful information in any EBR disclosures.  On the other hand, long-term lenders have a time horizon that 
makes EBR disclosures more relevant.  Accordingly, a proper Private Company EBR framework should take into 
account the changing informational needs of short-term versus long-term stakeholders.  The banking and lending 
community is the proper group to provide feedback on this question. 
 
FINANCIAL REPORTING OR SPIN 
 
 Much of the EBR criticism leveled at GAAP fails to take into account the difficulties of objectively 
measuring and reporting important qualitative business information.  The EBR philosophy sounds wonderful in 
theory, but actually employing EBR is difficult because most of the value of business intangibles is predicated on the 
occurrence of unknowable future events. 
 
 Research and development expenditures are a prime example.  GAAP requires that R&D be expensed as 
incurred; this clearly violates the matching principle.  The paradox is explained by recognizing that there is no precise 
way of measuring R&D because its value is tied to unknowable future events.  Accordingly, the principle of 
conservatism steps in and overrides the need for matching revenues and expenses; the result is a conservative balance 
sheet valuation.  In simple language, it is better to expense R&D and sacrifice the matching principle than to allow 
management the opportunity to clutter up the balance sheet with worthless assets disguised as R&D.  However, EBR 
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recognizes the presentation of R&D as part of its theoretical framework.  Yet, what exactly is disclosed beyond a 
monetary expenditure for research?  Any company can spin a public relations oriented justification for spending 
money on dubious projects.  Moreover, independent auditors are unable to prove that dubious “R&D expenditures” 
are bogus because management can always allude to the possibility of future benefits.  The inability to audit the true 
value of R&D is the primary justification for expensing it as incurred. 
 
 Embracing R&D disclosures as part of the EBR framework opens the door for officially sanctioned “spin” in 
financial reporting.  Moreover, R&D is only the tip of the EBR iceberg when it comes to introducing immeasurable 
business information.  The business landscape, strategy, and competencies and resources dimensions are rife with 
opportunities for management to misrepresent their business prospects in a manner that is difficult to verify by 
auditors.  If history has taught us anything, we know that management will use every opportunity to present a 
favorable image of corporate performance irrespective of reality (e.g., Enron, et al.). 
 
 Under GAAP, management enthusiasm is restrained by objective and measurable reporting standards that are 
verifiable by independent auditors.  The most penetrating criticism of the EBR philosophy concerns the systematic 
introduction of highly subjective and difficult to measure qualitative financial reporting variables that are not subject 
to audit at reasonable cost (Pinsker, 2003).  Accordingly, the gains of providing better value oriented financial 
reporting information through EBR are offset by potential management misrepresentation through unverifiable EBR 
disclosures.  Financial reporting may become less transparent because investors could have to evaluate a bad earnings 
quarter against management’s EBR disclosures that argue short-term sacrifices were made to achieve long-term 
business gains.  The difficulties with potential management biases are compounded when one considers the need for 
reporting EBR intangible liabilities. 
 
EBR INTANGIBLE LIABILITIES 
 
 Proponents of the EBR philosophy are quick to point out the persuasive arguments favoring the disclosure of 
intangible assets under EBR (Anderson, et al., 2005).  However, there is minimal discussion of the corresponding 
intangible liabilities.  Poor product or service quality; inadequate or improperly focused R&D; poorly trained 
workers/management; inadequate new-product development processes; high turnover of employees, customers, or 
suppliers; discriminatory hiring practices; etc. are intangible liabilities under the EBR framework.  Other examples 
include dangerous working conditions; potentially litigious products; product tampering by employees during labor 
difficulties; antiquated manufacturing processes; potential environmental cleanup; and poor company reputation.  
Each intangible asset under the EBR framework has a corresponding intangible liability counterpart that should be 
considered for fair presentation of a company’s prospects.    
 
 Each company should evaluate their own strengths and weaknesses according to the EBR framework, and 
report their corresponding intangible assets and liabilities without bias.  However, management self-interest could 
result in EBR disclosures that overstate intangible assets and understate intangible liabilities.  Exacerbating this 
intangible reporting bias, the voluntary nature of EBR can be manipulated to the detriment of transparency (Burnett, 
et al., 2006).  For example, under favorable circumstances, management may provide supplemental EBR information 
that supports higher company valuations.  However, if the circumstances become unfavorable, management declines 
to participate in the EBR program.  A more cosmetically hidden variation of this theme involves having management 
continue to participate in EBR, but refusing to objectively recognize legitimate intangible EBR liabilities. 
 
 The highly subjective nature of the EBR framework provides a rich environment for unscrupulous managers 
to manipulate “intangible earnings” by taking every opportunity to report intangible assets while avoiding the 
corresponding intangible liabilities.  Independent auditors will be challenged because current Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards are designed to audit GAAP financial statements rather than EBR intangible assets and liabilities.  
Moreover, modifying current auditing procedures to accommodate EBR reporting may be cost prohibitive for reasons 
discussed below. 
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THE EBR AUDITOR 
 
 If EBR disclosures are implemented, they must be audited by independent CPAs.  Current Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards provide little guidance in auditing EBR disclosures because auditors have traditionally 
focused on financial information that can be reasonably observed, calculated, or proven with logical inference (Arens, 
et al., 2006).  For example, actuarial and statistical specialists can be employed by CPAs to estimate the current cost 
of future medical benefits to employees.  However, these specialists are useless for estimating the value of EBR 
intangibles because most of the reference points used in judging EBR performance variables are ambiguous.  
Reasonable people can disagree about business landscape factors, correct business strategy, or the competencies and 
resources available to a company.  Moreover, even if there is consensus regarding the existence of intangible assets or 
liabilities, estimating the potential benefit or loss is frequently an impossible task for management or independent 
auditors. 
 
 Harvey and Lusch (1999) develop a six-step process for assessing off-balance sheet intangible liabilities that 
can be applied to the problems facing EBR auditors.  First, is there persuasive evidence that EBR intangible assets or 
liabilities exists?  The primary mechanism for collecting this information would be an EBR questionnaire.  This 
questionnaire is analogous to the auditor's internal control questionnaire, but management would respond to questions 
regarding EBR intangibles such as customer relations, corporate reputation, strategic planning, unfavorable working 
conditions, etc.  These questionnaires would be tailored so that different members of management would be queried 
with relevance to their specific area of expertise.  If questionnaire results indicate the existence of possible EBR 
intangibles, then follow-up interviews are conducted to examine the evidence supporting these assertions.  The 
questionnaires should be designed with recognition that management will be very forthcoming with intangible assets, 
but less so with intangible liabilities.  EBR auditors should also spend significant time querying rank and file 
employees, customers, suppliers, and industry experts to confirm the assertions of management. 
 
 Second, if there are EBR intangible liabilities, to whom are they owed?  A poorly trained workforce is an 
intangible liability, but it does not produce a specific debt to a particular entity.  Accordingly, this intangible liability 
needs to be acknowledged qualitatively; however, there is no need to grapple with a mathematical calculation to 
measure it.  On the other hand, ongoing violations of environmental laws can result in real liabilities to governmental 
agencies.  Liabilities owed to standing organizations must be taken more seriously than loosely organized coalitions 
of consumers or stockholders.  Moreover, the consequences of failing to respond properly to the needs and rights of 
these organizations or coalitions must be considered when preparing EBR disclosures. 
 
 Third, determine the magnitude (where applicable) of EBR intangibles.  Specific dollar measurements of 
EBR intangible assets and liabilities should not be made unless the auditor can undertake a reasonably objective and 
verifiable process.  Moreover, the informational needs of the appropriate stakeholders must be the governing factor 
when deciding whether to calculate the value of EBR intangibles.  Conceptually, EBR intangible assets are measured 
by evaluating the expected present value of their future cash flows.  On the other hand, measuring intangible liabilities 
such as a company's decision to pursue a bad idea or project must involve the accrual of development costs, 
replacement costs, and the present value of current and future opportunity costs of the failed project (Caddy, 2000). 
 
 Fourth, does the informational infrastructure to systematically report on EBR intangibles for the current and 
future periods exist at reasonable cost?  Unless there is naturally occurring data and information that support the 
existence of EBR intangibles, cost considerations will be a significant barrier for management and independent 
auditors. 
 
 Fifth, assess the likelihood that specific EBR intangibles will materialize.  This likelihood assessment factor 
will be a major barrier in auditor approval of many EBR disclosures.  Misreading these likelihoods can easily change 
a major intangible liability into an asset, or vice versa.  For example, suppose a drug company spends enormous sums 
pursuing a cure for Alzheimer's disease.  If they succeed, there is enormous financial gain, but if they fail, the 
company is bankrupt.  Auditors can review the expenditures and read lab reports, but they cannot reasonably estimate 
the likelihood of success.  The likelihood that EBR intangibles will materialize is frequently a function of changing 
consumer tastes, unpredictable competitor and supplier actions, shifts in the economy, random fluctuations in 
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technological development, and luck.  The very nature of a society driven by intellectual capital is one of instability 
and unexpected change.  Accordingly, auditors must evaluate the likelihood of future events, and only allow the 
reporting of EBR intangibles if it is probable that material intangible assets or liabilities exist. 
 
 Finally, auditors should consider whether the EBR disclosures interface properly with GAAP.  Some EBR 
intangibles may qualify as loss-contingencies, and EBR changes may raise consistency issues in how these 
contingencies are reported from year to year.  Ultimately, the auditor must insure that EBR disclosures support or 
enhance GAAP financial statements.     
 
 The possibility of fraud adds another major complication for EBR auditors.  Current auditor training in fraud 
is confined to defalcation or the deliberate misrepresentation of GAAP financial statements.  Fraud specialists in 
public accounting firms are trained from a forensic accounting perspective; however, EBR fraud opens the door to 
falsifying experiments, drug tests, research results, etc.  In conventional auditing scenarios, auditors are able to 
recognize when to employ the services of a specialist for actuarial, engineering, or appraisal purposes.  However, 
most independent auditors cannot recognize the telltale signs of fraud in scientific research.  Accordingly, these 
auditors will have difficulties knowing whether to retain the expensive services of research specialists to audit the 
scientific findings of some EBR disclosures. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 With a proper perspective, the EBR framework makes a valid contribution to financial reporting.  The value 
of EBR lies in challenging stereotyped GAAP reporting; it allows the financial reporting community to think “outside 
the box.”  Intangible assets and liabilities are the wave of the future, and the financial reporting community needs to 
think long and hard about better ways to effectively report this valuable financial information.  However, meaningful 
gains in this area will be slow because most of the conceptually valid EBR ideas are difficult to audit at reasonable 
cost. 
 
 Ultimately, the financial reporting community must look to auditors for developing better methods of 
auditing EBR disclosures at reasonable cost.  Generally Accepted Auditing Standards must evolve into a more 
adaptable process that recognizes unconventional auditing methods when evaluating EBR intangibles.  Auditors will 
need to develop a niche along various EBR dimensions.  For example, auditors of drug companies may retain 
specialists in the area of drug research to accurately evaluate and approve the reporting of R&D drug expenditures.  
Similarly, other specialists may be retained in the areas of organizational structure, environmental impact, computer 
technology, human resource management, etc.  These specialists will not operate in a traditional auditing sense; 
instead, they will focus on assessing EBR intangibles as probable assets or liabilities.  After a valid determination that 
probable assets or liabilities exist, auditors will evaluate the language and method of disclosure in a cautious and 
consistent manner.  Future research should focus on finding better ways to audit EBR disclosures at reasonable cost. 
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